Russia has moved from requiring VPNs to obey its blocklist in 2017 to blocking hundreds of VPN services, the protocols they rely on and the app store listings that distribute them. By February 2026, Human Rights Watch counted 469 blocked VPN services. Using a VPN is still not itself an offense, but promoting VPNs and searching for banned content are fined, and regional mobile shutdowns leave only government-approved “whitelisted” services reachable.
How the legal framework developed
2017: VPNs must follow the blocklist
In July 2017, President Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law No. 276-FZ, in force from November 2017. It bars VPNs and anonymizers from giving access to websites banned in Russia and lets the regulator, Roskomnadzor, block services that do not comply (HRW, 2017). For several years enforcement was patchy. According to Freedom House’s timeline, Roskomnadzor began sending popular VPNs direct orders to connect to its blocklist in 2019, and started blocking some of the best-known services between June and September 2021 (Freedom House, 2025).
Tor was targeted in the same period. From December 1, 2021, Russian internet providers began blocking Tor, including some built-in bridges. At the time Russia had more than 300,000 daily Tor users, about 15% of the global total (Tor Project, 2021).
Platform blocks after the 2022 invasion
After the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, OONI measurements showed Twitter throttled and then blocked, Facebook blocked from March 4, and major foreign news outlets blocked, with blocking measured on more than 50 Russian networks (OONI, 2022). Freedom House notes these platform blocks drove a surge in the use of anti-censorship tools (Freedom House, 2025).
Promotion bans and search fines since 2024
The newer measures target information about VPNs and the people who use them. A law banning the promotion of VPNs took effect in March 2024, and a July 2024 amendment extended it to scientific and technical information about such tools (Freedom House, 2025). In July 2025 the State Duma passed a law fining people for intentionally searching for “extremist” material, including through VPNs, and making VPN use in a crime an aggravating circumstance (Meduza, 2025). Human Rights Watch reports the search fines applied from September 2025 (HRW, 2026).
| Penalty (2025 law) | Individuals | Officials | Companies | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Intentionally searching for “extremist” materials | 3,000-5,000 rubles | n/a | n/a | Meduza, 2025 |
| Advertising VPN services | 50,000-80,000 rubles | 80,000-150,000 rubles | 200,000-500,000 rubles | Meduza, 2025 |
Timeline of measures
| Date | Measure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Jul 2017 (in force Nov 2017) | Law 276-FZ requires VPNs and anonymizers to block banned sites | HRW, 2017 |
| 2019 | Roskomnadzor orders popular VPNs to comply with its blocklist or face blocking | Freedom House, 2025 |
| Jun-Sep 2021 | Authorities begin blocking some of the most popular VPN services | Freedom House, 2025 |
| Dec 2021 | ISPs begin blocking Tor and some bridges | Tor Project, 2021 |
| Feb-Mar 2022 | Twitter and Facebook blocked after the invasion of Ukraine | OONI, 2022 |
| Mar 2024 | Ban on promoting or advertising VPNs takes effect | Freedom House, 2025 |
| Jul-Sep 2024 | Apple removes nearly 58 VPN apps from the Russian App Store | Freedom House, 2025 |
| Oct 2024 | 197 VPN services blocked | Freedom House, 2024 |
| Mar-Apr 2025 | Roskomnadzor sends Google takedown orders for 212 VPN apps | Freedom House, 2025 |
| Sep 2025 | Fines for searching “extremist” content, including via VPN, apply | HRW, 2026 |
| Dec 2025 | Blocking of the three most popular VPN protocols begins | HRW, 2026 |
| Feb 2026 | 469 VPN services blocked | HRW, 2026 |
| Mar 2026 | Weeks-long mobile internet shutdown in Moscow; “whitelists” of approved sites | HRW, 2026 |
| Apr-May 2026 | Operators told to block Apple ID top-ups and charge for international mobile traffic above 15 GB a month | Mediazona, 2026 |
Protocols, app stores and payments
Protocol blocking
Early blocks targeted named services, while the current approach targets the technology. Human Rights Watch reports that the three most popular VPN protocols have been blocked since December 2025 (HRW, 2026). According to Mediazona, VLESS, a protocol many providers had adopted to evade detection, was blocked in late 2025, and providers responded by pushing new configurations to users (Mediazona, 2026). Mediazona also describes a Digital Development Ministry manual for companies on spotting VPN users, for example by comparing user IP addresses with known address lists.
App store removals
Freedom House reports that Apple removed nearly 58 VPN apps from its Russian store between July and September 2024 without public explanation, and that its timeline counts at least 98 VPN apps unavailable there. Roskomnadzor’s 212 takedown orders to Google in spring 2025 included apps already missing from the Russian Play Store; the GreatFire monitoring project found 53 VPN apps unavailable but no evidence that Google complied with the orders themselves (Freedom House, 2025).
Money and mobile data
The 2026 measures make paying for and using foreign VPNs harder. Operators were told to block mobile-account top-ups of Apple ID balances by April 1, 2026, partly to cut off VPN purchases, and to start charging for international mobile traffic above 15 GB a month from May 1 (Mediazona, 2026). The state itself relies on VPNs: the Russian government reportedly spent 14 billion rubles on state-approved VPNs in 2024, as state institutions and private companies use such tools mainly to work around sanctions (Freedom House, 2025).
Shutdowns and whitelists
Russia’s internet shutdown count is now among the highest in the world. Access Now recorded 19 shutdowns in Russia in 2025 (Access Now, 2026). In March 2026, mobile internet in central and southern Moscow was disrupted for about three weeks, and the government has introduced lists of “essential” sites that stay reachable during outages (HRW, 2026).
During such outages only approved destinations are reachable, so a VPN server abroad cannot be contacted at all. The Moscow Times reports that authorities in 83 regions imposed mobile internet shutdowns at least once since May 2025 (Moscow Times, 2026).
How people adapt
Despite the pressure, VPN use appears widespread. A 2025 survey by the Institute of Social Marketing, cited by The Moscow Times, found 46% of respondents had used a VPN at least once. Precise counts are elusive: a representative of a Russian VPN industry association told the paper that download numbers overstate users because many people install several VPNs as backups (Moscow Times, 2026).
Users and providers have adapted in several ways:
- Providers reissue settings as protocols are blocked, as happened after the VLESS block.
- Users keep several tools installed, because any single service may vanish.
- Some turn to Tor bridges. After the 2021 block, the Tor Project urged volunteers to run private bridges that censors had not yet discovered.
- People are shifting platforms. Human Rights Watch reports WhatsApp lost about 9 million Russian users between January and February 2026 as restrictions grew, while the state-backed Max messenger reached 77.5 million monthly users (HRW, 2026).
Freedom House scored Russia 17 out of 100 on internet freedom for June 2024 to May 2025, down from 20, citing among other things expanded VPN blocking and app store removal orders (Freedom House, 2025).
What this means for you
- Using a VPN is not itself an offense, but searching for material on Russia’s extremist list is, and so is promoting VPNs publicly. Using a VPN while committing a crime can lengthen a sentence.
- With protocols blocked and app listings removed, any one VPN may stop working without warning.
- When official listings disappear, copies from unofficial sources fill the gap. Check the developer and download only from the provider’s own channels.
- A state-approved VPN should not be treated as private. Russia’s 2017 law requires compliant VPNs to follow the government blocklist, so a VPN that operates openly in Russia is, by design, not a censorship workaround.
- During regional mobile shutdowns, no VPN can reach servers that are not on the approved whitelist.
Methodology and limitations
The timeline draws on Human Rights Watch statements (2017 and 2026), Freedom House reports (Freedom on the Net 2025 and the June 2025 “Tunnel Vision” special report), OONI network measurements, the Tor Project, and reporting by the independent outlets Meduza, Mediazona and The Moscow Times. It uses no VPN-demand figures from VPN vendors or review sites.
Blocking counts come from different organizations at different dates, often relayed from Roskomnadzor statements, so the 197 and 469 figures may not be strictly comparable. Freedom House’s printed timeline does not give exact days for some events, so those are listed by month or year only. Survey data on VPN use comes from a single Russian pollster as reported by The Moscow Times. Russian policy is changing quickly, and measures announced in spring 2026 may have been modified since.